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Abstract
We examine the impact of monetary incentives on
user onboarding in online sharing platforms.
Specifically, drawing upon the literature of monetary
incentives, privacy, and consumer behavior, we
conduct a randomized field experiment to explore
users’ initial engagement and interaction with an
online car-sharing platform. Our empirical analyses
show that monetary incentives are no better than
simple email reminders in encouraging users’ selfdisclosure of private information nor their active
engagement with the platform (i.e., actual booking via
the platform). Our work sheds new light on the heated
debate over the design and deployment of monetary
incentives in digital platforms, and provides useful
implications for both academia and the industry.

1. Introduction
The internet-based markets play a critical role in
today’s economy. They have greatly increased the
variety of product and service offerings, and improved
the efficiency of the exchange of information, goods,
services and payments [1]. Most recently, the
proliferation of digital platforms, such as Airbnb and
Uber, have made the sharing of physical assets much
cheaper and easier than ever, giving rise to the socalled “sharing economy”.
The companies under the umbrella of “sharing
economy” are attracting increasing attention from both
academics and practitioners, given their economic and
social significance. Specifically, the “collaborative
consumption” concept underlying the sharing
economy, holds great potential in maximizing social
welfare and contributing to environmental
sustainability. Take cars for example. The possibility
to rent a car in one’s neighborhood could lead to forgo
the ownership, and turn to on-demand services. This
could potentially reduce the total number of cars on
the streets and thereby alleviate the congestion [2, 3].
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Despite these promises, the majority of the peer-topeer sharing platforms still face the fundamental
challenge of how to attract more users on board and
get them engaged in the sharing activities facilitated
by the platform. While user onboarding processes are
designed and implemented in different ways -some
platforms have used a simple registration form
followed by a greeting message sent by email, while
others have chosen to use the social login option via
popular social networking platforms such as
Facebook, LinkedIn, and Twitter - given the nature of
these platforms, the collection of users’ personal data
is inevitable for the completion of any transaction. In
many cases, the amount of personal information
necessary to get started creates an intrinsic barrier in
users’ onboarding process, since the growing concern
for online privacy might reduce users’ willingness to
share personal information [4].
In this study, we are interested in understanding the
effects of monetary incentives on users’ onboarding
process at peer-to-peer car sharing platforms, where
users have to provide sensitive information such as the
registration information of a car and/or a digital copy
of a driver’s license to engage in any sharing activities.
There has been a long-lasting debate regarding the
role of monetary incentives (financial reward) in
motivating the disclosure of users’ personal
information: some have argued that monetary
incentives have positive effects on encouraging users
to share more personal data with the merchandise [5],
although the effect size varies depending on the
amount of the monetary incentive [6]; others have
found that the benefits of price discounts and
personalized service are not effective in mitigating
consumers’ privacy concerns [7]; or can even
unexpectedly intensify the concerns of privacy [8].
In light of these conflicting views and findings, we
conduct a randomized field experiment at a large peerto-peer car sharing platform by exogenously varying
the amount of the incentive received by new users at
the platform. Note that in the context of a peer-to-peer
car sharing platform, new users experience at least two
stages in their onboarding process: registration on the
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service and booking a car. Here, we seek to understand
the effects of monetary incentives in both stages.
Our empirical analysis demonstrates that monetary
incentives work no better than non-monetary
incentives, such as email reminders, in motivating
users to disclose personal information and engage in
transaction on the platform. Such finding contributes
to the growing literature on the role of monetary
incentives on user behavior on digital platforms, and
shed new light on the design and implementation of
the various incentive schemes.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The
next section reviews the related literature, which is
followed by a brief introduction of the focal digital
platform and the experimental design. Section 4
presents the empirical analyses and results. Section 5
discusses our main findings and their implications, and
outlines the directions for future work.

2. Related Literature
2.1. Monetary incentives and privacy concerns
According to the Oxford standard dictionary, an
incentive is “a thing that motivates or encourages
someone to do something”. Incentives can be
monetary rewards (e.g., cash bonus or discount for
desired behaviors) or non-monetary rewards (e.g.,
tangible recognition among peers, personalized
services). Prior research across different domains has
documented the effects of monetary incentives on
modifying behavior [9]. For example, prepaid
monetary incentives have shown to have a strong
positive impact on the response rate in mail surveys
[10], and store credits or coupons towards the next
purchase are proven to be an effective sales promotion
device [11, 12].
Drawing upon theories of self-disclosure, prior
research in the context of e-commerce demonstrates
that monetary incentives can be used as an effective
means to induce consumers to release more personal
information [13]. For instance, using a controlled lab
experiment where subjects were exposed to different
levels of monetary incentives ($0, $10, and $20), Hann
et al. [6] found that individuals’ decisions regarding
information disclosure depend on whether the
monetary reward exceeds a certain threshold level. In
another notable example, Beresford et al. [14]
demonstrated through a field experiment that the vast
majority of users did not hesitate in providing personal
information, such as monthly incomes, in return of a
price discount of €1 in their DVD purchases,
suggesting that monetary incentives can effectively
mitigate consumers’ privacy concerns.

It is worth noting that in many cases, the
motivation for introducing a monetary incentive may
be different from how a user perceives it, and it is
important to align users’ perception with the purpose
of the incentive scheme. For instance, in a controlled
lab experiment with student subjects, Andrade et al.
[8] found that, contrary to the conventional view,
monetary reward intensifies privacy concerns. Further
investigation suggests that a significant proportion of
the subjects considered the monetary reward “as
decoys, which companies employ to inveigle
individuals to reveal sensitive personal information”
[8]. Such finding underscores the necessity to account
for the confounding factors within the empirical
context when examining the role of monetary
incentives in shaping users’ information disclosure
behavior. In the case of Andrade et al. [8], it is likely
that the promised $10 check is perceived differently
than coupons or price discounts (i.e., the latter clearly
conveys the promotion nature).
With this in mind, we adopt an experimental
approach to explore the role of monetary incentives on
users’ information disclosure behavior in the online
environment. Unlike prior studies, which are largely
focused on the role of coupons or price discounts in
the traditional retailing sector, we have chosen to
examine the effects of monetary incentives on user
onboarding in a novel digital sharing platform.

2.2. Digital Sharing Platforms
While sharing of goods and services dates back to
the beginning of the human history, the key enabler to
those platforms operating at large-scale has been the
continuous development of information and
communication technologies [15].
The sharing economy is structured around the
disintermediation of conventional channels of
commerce in the exchange of products and services
[16]. As such, there are two guiding principles that
need to be taken into account when defining a sharing
economy company. First, its business model is based
on access, not on ownership. Second, it is grounded on
crowd-based networks [17].
More specifically, platforms in the sharing
economy:




Connects people that would not otherwise do
business together.
Create economies of scale to bring together
supply and demand.
Mediate in the relationship between supply and
demand, and create a trustworthy environment.
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The emerging sharing platforms have disrupted
many industries, which in turn led to significant
changes in many aspects of our life. Take the carsharing platforms for example. Recent studies [18]
have found that peer-to-peer sharing of cars enabled
by such platforms is associated with significant
reduction in miles travelled, gas consumption, and car
ownership.
Given the socioeconomic significance, it is
important to understand how different incentive
schemes affect users’ onboarding process, which is
crucial to the viability and success of sharing
platforms. Here, we seek to gain a comprehensive
understanding of users’ behavior during the initial
onboarding process under different incentive schemes,
and offer useful implications for the practical design
of sharing platforms.

3. The Field Experiment
3.1. CarShare
CarShare (a pseudonym), the company we have
partnered with in this study, is one of the oldest online
peer-to-peer car-sharing platforms in Europe.
Originating in the early 2000’s, when five neighbors
decided to share a car, the company has now grown
into a major player in the car-sharing business.
At CarShare, a booking is accepted immediately
when the requested car is available and the necessary
insurance is arranged. This removes the inherent
barrier for renting a car between peers, and thereby
makes it convenient for users to share their cars. The
ultimate goal of CarShare is to reduce the need for
additional cars (and thereby contribute to the energy
and environmental targets) by facilitating users to
share their cars, optimizing the use of cars.

3.2 Experimental Design
To understand the impact of incentives in the
sharing economy, we conducted a randomized field
experiment on new users of CarShare from April to
July in 2016. The experiment was seamlessly
integrated in the user onboarding processes, focusing
on the communication of incentives via email
reminders sent to the new users on the platform.
Users who would like to rent a car on the platform,
would need to provide personal details such as name,
gender, age, address and telephone number, along with
a digital copy of their driver’s license. In other words,
the requirement of personal data is the main hurdle to
user onboarding.

To motivate users to disclose their personal
information, and make their first bookings on the
platform, we incorporate both monetary as well as
non-monetary incentives.
The monetary incentives include discount coupons
of different values, which can be redeemed upon firsttime booking. The non-monetary incentive is in the
form of a simple reminder (see Appendix for more
details). The subjects in this experiment were new
users who had already signed up, but not completed
their profile (name, gender, address) after 24 hours
since registration. They were randomly assigned to the
following groups:
 Control: Subjects within this group did not receive
any treatment and is solely used for control.
 Group 1: Subjects within this group received an email with a reminder to complete their profiles.
 Group 2: Subjects within this group received an email with a reminder to complete their profiles, and
a discount coupon of €5 for their first trips.
 Group 3: Subjects within this group received an email with a reminder to complete their profiles, and
a discount coupon of €10 for their first trips.
The emails for both Group 2 and 3 contained a
discount coupon code that users could redeem
immediately upon completing their profiles. Since
booking a car is only possible with a completed
profile, the introduction of coupon codes would not
affect the user on-boarding process, i.e., it is not
possible for any user to bypass the self-disclosure
stage and redeem the coupon in the booking stage.
The experiment ran over the course of 10 weeks.
On each day, the system performed an automatic
check on the new sign-ups to validate whether they
had already completed their profile within 24 hours,
and if not, these users would be randomly assigned to
one of the four treatment groups. This process was
automated using heuristics that ran every morning on
a relational database management system.
To measure the response of users towards the
email, both the click-through-rate as well as the openrate were tracked. The email contained a tracking
pixel, which triggered a counter when the email was
opened. Click-through was tracked on the only button
in the email, guiding users to complete their profile.
We first conducted a trial experiment to see if there
were errors in the emails, targeting or elsewhere. This
was important, since everything that runs live on a
company environment is prone to errors. No errors
were identified and the data from the trial experiment
were included in the final data-set of our study.
We ensured that all the users within their treatment
groups received the email reminders. When an email
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was sent successfully, this was logged and could be
used to get matched against the user ID, and exclude
any user who did not receive the full treatment.
Concurrently, we also identified 35 instances
where the account was not created by a human, which
were classified as spam, and were removed from the
dataset.

4. Data and Empirical Analysis
Over the 10-week experiment period, we observed
a total of 2315 sign-ups1, where 1360 users either
immediately provided the required information during
the initial registration process or did so within 24
hours. The remaining 955 users did not provide the
required personal information after the first 24 hours
upon registration and, thereby, were randomly
assigned to the four treatment groups described above.
To obtain an initial understanding of the
population in the dataset, we first conducted some
descriptive analysis. Tables 1 and 2 summarize the
demographic information of the 955 subjects.
As can be seen from Table 1, among the users who
disclosed their personal information, most (48.8%) are
between the ages 18-55, roughly equally distributed
across age-groups, while only 6.8% of the population
of our study is above 55 years old.
Table 1. Age Distribution
Age
18–25
26–35
36–45
46–55
56–65
65 +
Total
Missing
Total

Frequency
122
139
97
108
47
18
531
424
955

Percentage
12.7
14.6
10.2
11.3
4.9
1.9
55.6
44.4
100.0

Overall, 44.4% of the subjects in our study (424
users) did not reveal their age information. Further, as
shown in Table 2, the gender distribution of our
subjects in the study is 18.2% females and 24.1%
males, while more than half of the subjects in our study
(550 users or 57.6%) did not provide their gender
information. As mentioned above, new users do not
need to provide their age, gender or driving license
upon sign-up, however, such information is necessary
to activate the account at CarShare and rent a car.

Table 2. Gender Distribution
Gender
Missing
Female
Male
Total

Frequency
550
175
230
955

Percent
57.6
18.3
24.1
100.0

Table 3 presents an overview of the experiment
results with respect to users’ self-disclosure. Overall,
239 users were assigned to the control Group, among
which 41 provided personal data; 240 users were
assigned to Group 1 (simple reminder), among which
51 disclosed personal information; 246 users were
assigned to Group 2 (simple reminder + €5), among
which 53 disclosed personal information; and 230
users were assigned to Group 3 (simple reminder +
€10) where 47 of them disclosed personal information.
Overall, approximately 80% of the subjects did not
provide their personal data.
Table 3. Users’ Self-Disclosure
Treatment
Condition
Control
Reminder
Reminder
+ €5
Reminder
+ €10
Total

Details not
provided
198
189

Details
provided
41
51

Total

191

55

246

182

48

230

760

195

955

239
240

Since only about 20% of the subjects in the focal
population (i.e., the 955 users who did not provide the
required information after the first 24 hours upon
registration) provided their personal information such
as age and gender, we were not able to run a full
randomization check. Nevertheless, a post-experiment
check shows that among the users who disclosed
themselves under the control and three treatment
conditions, the age distribution is quite similar to that
of the users who provided these details spontaneously
(see results from Table 1 and Table 4).
Table 4. Post-Experiment Randomization Check
Age
18–25
26–35
36–45
46–55
56–65
65 +

Control

Group 1

Group 2

Group 3

32
37
24
26
10
5

26
36
25
26
10
4

27
33
26
31
13
3

29
27
25
22
12
2

1

We have filtered out the accounts created by spammers based on
the email address provided during the sign-up process.
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To test the effects of incentives (reminder email
and discount coupons), we performed a series of Chisquare tests to determine whether there was any
significant difference between different treatments in
terms of information disclosure.
Specifically, we compared the disclosure rate
between each of the three treatment groups and the
control group: i) no reminder (control) vs. a simple
reminder (p-value=0.25), ii) no reminder (control) vs.
a reminder plus a €5 discount (p-value=0.15), iii) no
reminder (control) vs. a reminder plus a €10 discount
(p-value=0.30), as well the disclosure rate between
non-monetary treatment, low-monetary treatment and
high-monetary treatment. No significant difference
was found in terms of disclosure rate.

Following a similar procedure as above, we also
test whether the observed differences in conversion
rate shown in Table 6 are statistically significant.
Table 7 presents the results of the Chi-square tests.
Although the differences are not statistically
significant at the traditional level of p ≤ 0.05, when
comparing Group 1 (simple reminder) and Group 3
(reminder plus a €10 discount) with the control group,
we do observe marginally significant difference, i.e.,
users who received a simple reminder or a reminder
with a €10 discount coupon were more likely to make
bookings on the platform2. On the contrary, subjects
in Group 2 (simple reminder plus a €5 discount) were
no different than those in the control group in terms of
their actual booking behavior.

Table 5. Comparison of Users’ Self-Disclosure
Rate with Chi-square Test

Table 7. Comparison of Users’ Account
Activation with Chi-square Test

Group 1:
Reminder
Group 2:
Reminder
+ €5
Group 3:
Reminder
+ €10

Control
0.25

Group 1

0.15

0.77

0.30

0.92

Group 2

0.69

Group 1:
Reminder
Group 2:
Reminder
+ €5
Group 3:
Reminder
+ €10

Control
0.08

Group 1

0.67

0.19

0.11

0.90

Group 2

0.24

In addition to users’ information disclosure, we are
also interested in the impact of different incentives on
the conversion rate of actual booking. Table 6 presents
an overview of the conversion regarding account
activation. 17 users (7.1%) from the control group
made the booking during the experiment period.
Among the three treatment groups, the simple
reminder treatment (Group 1) yields the highest
conversion rate (11.7%).

Finally, we also checked whether the conversion
rate conditional on users’ self-disclosure is different
across the four groups. Tables 8 and 9 summarize these
findings. Specifically, while none of the treatment
groups show any significant difference from the
control group (conditional conversion rate is 41%), a
low monetary incentive seems to perform worse than
a simple email reminder (p-value=0.05) and a high
monetary incentive (p-value=0.07).

Table 6. Users’ Account Activation

Table 8. Users’ Account Activation Conditional
on Self-Disclosure

Treatment
Condition
Control

Account not
activated
222

Account
activated
17

Total
239

Reminder

212
28
240
Reminder
226
20
246
+ €5
Reminder
204
26
230
+ €10
Total
864
91
955
Note: Accounts are activated only when users make the
first booking on the platform.

Treatment
Condition

Account not
activated

Control
Reminder
Reminder
+ €5
Reminder
+ €10
Total

Total

24

Account
activated
(%)
17 (41%)

23

28 (55%)

51

35

20 (36%)

55

22

26 (54%)

48

104

91 (47%)

195

41

2

When we group the subjects from Group 1 and Group 3 and
compare the conversion rate between this merged group with control
group, we get a p-value of 0.07.
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Table 9. Comparison of Users’ Account
Activation Conditional on Self-Disclosure with
Chi-square Test
Control
Group 1:
Reminder
Group 2:
Reminder
+ €5
Group 3:
Reminder
+ €10

Group 1

Group 2

0.20

0.61

0.05

0.23

0.94

0.07

At the outset, the results from Table 7 and Table 9
suggest a U-shaped effect of monetary incentives, that
is, a low level of monetary incentive may be worse
than a non-monetary incentive and a high level of
monetary incentive in motivating users to actively
engage in the transactions on the platform.

5. Discussion
In this paper, we examine the impact of different
incentives on user onboarding behavior using a
randomized field experiment at a large peer-to-peer
sharing platform. We find that contrary to the
conventional view, coupons or financial rewards is
ineffective in motivating users to disclose their
personal information in the initial onboarding stage.
However, as soon as the users move to the next
stage in their onboarding journey, a simple reminder
email can work as effectively as or even better than
monetary incentives in persuading them to convert to
active users. To the best of our knowledge, this is the
first empirical study that directly compares the effects
of different incentives (monetary vs. non-monetary)
on users’ privacy disclosure and actual behavior with
an experimental design seamlessly incorporated in the
onboarding process of a real-world company.
Our findings need to be interpreted with caution.
Reminder emails have been proven useful in this study
for users to activate their account. However, including
additional price discount in the reminder emails does
not necessarily improve such conversion. This
particular finding contradicts the results of the extant
literature (e.g., [5] and [14]), and is also distinct from
the results reported in [8], where the provision of a
reward unexpectedly intensified the privacy concern.
Note that the authors of [8] posited that such
negative effect of financial reward might be, from the
perspective of subjects (students), due to inadequate
compensation for disclosing sensitive information. In
a similar vein, the insignificant effect associated with
the monetary incentives in our study may be attributed

to the low perceived value of the monetary
compensation for personal data. Specifically, the
discount of €5 or €10 may only constitute a very small
portion of the total rent of a car for a certain period (for
instance for a week). Therefore, such monetary
incentive could not render any stronger effects than a
simple reminder email in encouraging users to disclose
personal information.
Second, in the context of car sharing, it might be
much more sensible for customers to provide their
driving license information during booking instead of
the registration process; when customers are already
determined to initiate a car booking, a small discount,
when compared to a reminding email, might be only
considered as icing on the cake, but not the sufficient
incentive to induce different behavior.

5.1. Implications
From the theoretical perspective, while our study
cannot reconcile the inconsistent findings of the extant
literature on monetary incentive and privacy
disclosure, it provides strong evidence for users’
unwillingness to trade off personal identifiable
information with a low purchase discount. Such
finding suggests the indirect psychological effect
associated with monetary incentives may work in the
opposite direction to the direct price effect and thereby
crowd out the desired behavior (i.e., disclosure of
personal information) at the sharing platform. In this
regard, the findings from the current study bear some
similarity with the results from [19] where the authors
demonstrate that while effective in inducing larger
volumes of reviews, monetary incentives are less
effective than social norms (non-monetary incentives)
in generating long reviews. In light of such findings, a
promising way to improve the conversion rate during
the on-boarding process could be a combination of
monetary incentive and social norm. A full treatment
of this topic is beyond the scope of our current paper
and we will leave it for future work. Our findings also
provide implication for practice, as we provide
managers with novel insights for better understanding
user behavior in the sharing economy, and into the
mechanisms that contribute to the onboarding of new
users. Further, we demonstrate that users’ sensitivity
to incentives differs across different stages in the
onboarding process. In particular, when they have
established the initial relationship (e.g., disclose their
personal information) with the platform, a simple
email reminder (non-monetary incentive) can work as
effectively as monetary incentives in motivating the
users to further engage in transactions at the platform.
This is good news for many start-ups in the sharing
economy, as user-onboarding is vital to the survival
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and success of those companies but they typically face
tight budget constraints.

5.2. Limitations
The current study bears several limitations. To start
with, the measurement of email opening is not perfect,
although it has been widely adopted in the majority of
randomized field experiments that leverage emails to
assign treatments. The reason is that all emails were
sent to the registered users before a loyal relationship
was established between the platform and those users,
some email clients might block the images containing
the tracking pixel, and thereby not all opens could be
tracked. In other words, only the connection between
the treatment and the final action (disclosure of
personal information and booking) could be reliably
tracked. It is possible that some observed conversion
in the treatment groups is purely voluntary (e.g., users
who did not open the email but returned to complete
their profile after 24 hours of registration) and not
driven by the assigned treatments.
Second, the fact that emails were sent at the same
time each day could also be a weakness, given that
some users received their email later than others
compared to the moment of signup.
Finally, while we have a reasonably large sample,
since we do not observe all the demographic
information from the entire sample of users, it is not
possible to discover nuances in users’ privacy
disclosure. This also limits our ability to interpret the
counterintuitive findings from the experimental data.

5.3. Future Work
In the current paper, we have primarily focused on
the effect of monetary incentives on users’ information
disclosure and short-term engagement (i.e., first-time
booking) at digital car-sharing platforms. Future
research can incorporate non-monetary incentives
such as social norms [19] to further understand users’
sharing behavior. Further, it is worthwhile to dig into
the long-term effect of various incentives.
To this point, our current study serves as a useful
starting point, and our empirical setup provides rich
opportunities to explore interesting phenomena and
design problems in the emerging digital sharing
platforms.

5.4. Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we examine the impact of monetary
incentives on user onboarding at digital sharing
platforms. We demonstrate that monetary incentives

work no better than non-monetary incentives (e.g., a
simple email reminder) in encouraging users to
disclose personal information and to actively
participate in the transactions of peer-to-peer sharing
platforms.
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7. Appendix
Automatic email sent upon initial registration3:

Email reminder sent after 24 hours of registration:
SUBJECT:
Reminder: We want to get to know you better!
Dear FIRSTNAME,
Great that you signed up at CarShare. Before you can
rent, we want to get to know you a little better. Please
log in to your profile page at CarShare and complete
the information. You can also upload your license there
so we can verify your data.
Do you have any questions? Feel free to reply to this
email, we are glad to help.
LINK TO THE LOG-IN PAGE

Email reminder with monetary incentive sent after 24
hours of registration:
SUBJECT:
€DISCOUNT, for a complete profile!
Dear FIRSTNAME,
Great that you signed up at CarShare. Before you can
rent, we want to get to know you a little better. Please
log in to your profile page at CarShare and complete
the information. You can also upload your license
there so we can verify your data.
Once you complete the profile, you can redeem the
following voucher (code: XXXXX) of €DISCOUNT
for your first booking. Respond quickly and enjoy
your discount!
Do you have any questions? Feel free to reply to this
email, we are glad to help.
LINK TO THE LOG-IN PAGE

SUBJECT:
FIRSTNAME, please complete your profile!
Dear FIRSTNAME,
Great that you signed up at CarShare! Before you can
rent, we want to get to know you a little better. Please
log in to your profile page at CarShare and complete
the information. You can also upload your license there
so we can verify your data.
Do you have any questions? Feel free to reply to this
email, we are glad to help.
LINK TO THE LOG-IN PAGE
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The emails presented here are English translations of the original
ones which were written in the local language (non-English).
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